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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement following the denial of his motion to 
suppress, Leo Philip Bonner pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled 
substance and misdemeanor resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement.  The district 
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the 
sentence, and placed Mr. Bonner on probation for a period of two years.  On appeal, 
Mr. Bonner asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The district court, after a hearing on Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress, made the 
following findings of fact: 
[A]t approximately 6:00 p.m. Officer Mortensen of the Coeur d’Alene 
Police Department conducted a traffic stop1 of a purple Toyota 4-Runner.  
According to Officer Mortensen he was familiar with this particular vehicle 
and it was a known drug vehicle.  Officer Mortensen testified that upon 
making contact with the driver of the vehicle and its occupants, Mark 
Colandonato [the driver], Jordan McElwain, and Leo Bonner (Defendant), 
he detected the odor of marijuana and observed a pocket knife in the 
center console.  Officer Mortensen collected the vehicle’s occupants’ 
identification information, returned to his vehicle, and requested a backup 
officer. 
 
Upon the arrival of a backup officer, Officer Mortensen asked 
Mr. Colandonato and Mr. McElwain to exit the vehicle; both men complied 
and Officer Mortensen conducted a frisk of each man as he exited.  When 
Mr. Colandonato exited the vehicle, Officer Mortensen observed a 12” 
long silver metal club type object between the driver’s seat and driver’s 
side door.  When Officer Mortensen frisked Mr. McElwain he located a 
small knife on his person. 
 
                                            
1 Officer Mortensen had seen the 4-Runner turn onto the road from a gas station without 
coming to a complete stop.  (R., p.88.) 
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 After Mr. Colandonato and Mr. McElwain had exited the vehicle, 
Officer Mortensen asked Mr. Bonner to also exit.  Mr. Bonner repeatedly 
refused, became nervous, and was argumentative.  After several refusals, 
Officer Mortensen reached into the vehicle to grab Mr. Bonner’s right arm 
and only then did Mr. Bonner exit the vehicle.  After Mr. Bonner exited the 
vehicle, Officer Mortensen conducted a frisk of his person; during the frisk 
Officer Mortensen located a meth pipe in Mr. Bonner’s shirt pocket. 
 
 After removing the men from the vehicle, Officer Mortensen 
conducted a search of the vehicle during which he located additional 
paraphernalia and marijuana.  Ultimately Mr. Bonner was placed under 
arrest for possession of paraphernalia. 
 
(R., pp.104-05 (footnote omitted).  See generally State’s Ex. 2 (copy of the video 
recording of the traffic stop).)  Officer Mortensen took Mr. Bonner to the Kootenai 
County Public Safety Building, where heroin and methamphetamine were found on 
Mr. Bonner’s person.  (See R., p.89.) 
 The State charged Mr. Bonner by Information with two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), one count of 
possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. § 37-2734A, and 
one count of resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement, misdemeanor, in violation of 
I.C. § 18-705.  (See R., pp.54-56.)  Mr. Bonner pleaded not guilty.  (R., p.61.) 
 Mr. Bonner filed a Motion to Suppress, based on the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, §§ 13 and 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution.  (R., pp.65-66.)  The motion to suppress asserted “the State’s warrantless 
search, seizure, and arrest was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United 
States and of the State of Idaho.”  (R., p.65.)  The State filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Suppress.  (R., pp.67-82.) 
 At the motion to suppress hearing, the parties stipulated there was a warrantless 
arrest.  (R., p.82.)  Officer Mortensen testified on behalf of the State.  (R., pp.82-86; 
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Tr., Apr. 9, 2015, p.4, L.5 – p.28, L.19.)   Mr. Bonner did not call any witnesses on his 
behalf.  (Tr., Apr. 9, 2015, p.28, Ls.22-24.)  The parties stipulated to the admission of 
the video recording of the traffic stop.  (R., p.86.)   
 Following the hearing, Mr. Bonner filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Suppress Evidence.  (R., pp.88-100.)  The memorandum presented two issues: “A.  The 
search should be suppressed because the faint odor of marijuana without more 
information is not sufficient to search the entire vehicle.  And even [i]f probable cause 
existed to search the vehicle it did not extend to search of the persons”; and “B.  The 
Terry Frisk and subsequent evidence must be suppressed because Officer Mortensen 
had no articulable suspicion that Mr. Bonner was both armed and presently dangerous 
to warrant a pat down.”  (R., p.88.)2 
 The district court then issued a Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant’s 
Motion to Suppress.  (R., pp.104-13.)  According to the district court, “Officer Mortensen 
decided to search the vehicle due to the detected odor of marijuana; the Court finds that 
pursuant to [State v. Schmadeka, 136 Idaho 595 (Ct. App. 2001),] a warrantless search 
of the passenger compartment was lawful because the odor of marijuana gave rise to 
probable cause.”  (R., p.108.)  The district court determined that, “[b]ecause the lawful 
search of the passenger compartment turned up additional contraband . . . Officer 
Mortensen had probable cause to complete a search of the entire vehicle.”  (R., p.109 
(citing State v. Shepherd, 118 Idaho 121 (Ct. App. 1990).)  Thus, the district court found 
the search of the car was valid pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement.  (R., p.109.) 
                                            
2 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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The district court made the following findings of fact with respect to the Terry 
frisk: 
Officer Mortensen testified that at the time of the stop it was dark outside 
and the stop occurred under an overpass.  Officer Mortensen also testified 
that he had had prior contacts with the vehicle, and he can be heard on 
[the video recording] advising the backup officer that it was a known drug 
vehicle.  Officer Mortensen testified that during his initial contact with the 
vehicle he observed a pocket knife in the center console; according to 
Officer Mortensen this knife was within arm’s reach of all passengers.  
Officer Mortensen further testified that when he asked the driver of the 
vehicle to exit, he observed an approximately 12” long silver colored type 
metal club on the floor between the driver’s seat and door.  During a frisk 
of passenger Jordan McElwain, Officer Mortensen located an additional 
small knife.  After making his initial contact with the vehicle’s occupants 
Officer Mortensen requested a backup officer to respond to the scene. 
 
 Furthermore, as to the Terry frisk of Mr. Bonner, the Court finds that 
Mr. Bonner was uncooperative and argumentative with Officer Mortensen 
when Officer Mortensen requested he exit the vehicle.  Officer Mortensen 
testified that Mr. Bonner’s demeanor was extremely nervous.  Mr. Bonner 
repeatedly refused to exit the vehicle, and did not exit until Officer 
Mortensen reached into the vehicle to grab Mr. Bonner’s right arm.  
According to Officer Mortensen he had officer safety concerns based upon 
Mr. Bonner’s high level of nervousness and noncompliance.   
 
(R., pp.110-11.) 
 The district found that under the totality of the circumstances “Officer Mortensen 
reasonably concluded, based on his observations, that Mr. Bonner may have been 
armed and presently dangerous.”  (R., p.111.)  The district court further found “the 
observations of the weapons in the vehicle and Mr. Bonner’s uncooperative and 
nervous demeanor, served to further exacerbate Officer Mortensen’s concerns for 
officer safety.”  (R., p.111.)  The district court found “that based on the totality of the 
circumstances, Officer Mortensen was entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of 
Mr. Bonner’s outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to 
assault the officers at the scene.”  (R., p.111.)  The district court also found “pursuant to 
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the plain feel doctrine, Officer Mortensen was justified in conducting a warrantless 
seizure of the pipe from Mr. Bonner’s shirt pocket.”  (R., p.112.)  The district court 
therefore denied Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress.  (R., p.112.) 
 Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Bonner agreed to plead guilty to 
one count of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, and one count 
of resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement.  (See R., pp.117-18.)  Mr. Bonner also 
agreed to waive his right to appeal as to conviction.  (R., p.118.)  The State agreed to a 
sentencing recommendation not to exceed a rider.  (See R., p.118.)  Mr. Bonner’s plea 
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., p.119.)  If 
Mr. Bonner prevailed on appeal, he would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.  
(R., p.119.)  The district court accepted Mr. Bonner’s guilty plea.  (R., p.117.) 
 For possession of a controlled substance, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed 
Mr. Bonner on supervised probation for a period of two years.3  (R., pp.145-49.)   
 Mr. Bonner filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s judgment.  
(R., pp.153-56.) 
  
 
                                            
3 For the resisting and/or obstructing law enforcement count, the district court imposed a 
sentence of eleven days jail, with credit for eleven days served.  (R., p.114.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress? 
 7 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Bonner’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Bonner asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, 
because his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
was denied.  The Terry frisk of Mr. Bonner was not justified, because the facts known to 
the officer would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr. Bonner was 
armed and dangerous.   
 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
 
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated.  An appellate court 
defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and 
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.  State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 17.  Evidence obtained in violation of these 
constitutional protections generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of 
the illegal government action.  See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511, 518-19 (2012); 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11 (2009).  This exclusionary rule “applies to 
evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence 
discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous 
tree.”  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.   
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Here, the parties stipulated there was a warrantless arrest of Mr. Bonner.  
(R., p.82.)  “Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively 
unreasonable unless if falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.”  
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).  “When a warrantless search or seizure is 
challenged by the defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.”  Id. 
 
C. The Terry Frisk Of Mr. Bonner Was Not Justified, Because The Facts Known To 
The Officer Would Not Have Caused A Reasonable Person To Conclude 
Mr. Bonner Was Armed And Dangerous 
 
Mr. Bonner asserts his Terry frisk by Officer Mortensen was not justified, 
because the facts known to the officer would not have caused a reasonable person to 
conclude Mr. Bonner was armed and dangerous.  Generally, a search must be 
authorized by a warrant that is based on probable cause, unless one of the exceptions 
to the warrant requirement applies.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 818.  “One such exception is 
the pat-down search for weapons acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in 
Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)].”  Id.  “Under Terry, an officer may conduct a 
limited pat-down search, or frisk, ‘of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his 
or her body in an attempt to find weapons.’”  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.) 
A Terry frisk “is only justified when, at the moment of the frisk, the officer has 
reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating is ‘armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or others’ and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter 
dispels the officer’s belief.”  Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.)  “The test is an objective 
one that asks whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent 
person would be justified in concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger.”  Id.  
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“To meet this standard, the officer must indicate specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, in light of his or her experience, 
justify the officer’s suspicion that the individual was armed and dangerous.”  Id. at 818-
19 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Although an officer need not possess absolute 
certainty that an individual is armed and dangerous, an officer’s inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not enough to justify a frisk.”  Id. at 819 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Bishop listed several factors that “influence whether 
a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular person 
was armed and dangerous,” including 
whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a 
weapon; whether the encounter took place late at night or in a high crime 
area; and whether the individual made threatening or furtive movements, 
indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or 
agitated, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, 
was unwilling to cooperate, or had a reputation for being dangerous. 
 
Id.  The Court observed “[w]hether any of these considerations, taken together or by 
themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of 
the circumstances.”  Id.  “For a frisk to be held constitutional, an officer must 
demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk support the 
conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.”  Id. 
 Under the totality of the circumstances here, the facts known to Officer 
Mortensen would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr. Bonner was 
armed and dangerous.  Although the district court found Mr. Bonner was uncooperative 
and nervous (see R., pp.110-11), the district court did not find Mr. Bonner made any 
threatening movements, indicated he possessed a weapon, or had a reputation for 
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being dangerous.  See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819.  Mr. Bonner did not have any bulges 
in his clothing that resembled a weapon, and the incident did not occur late at night or in 
a high crime area.  See id.  While Officer Mortensen saw a knife and a club in the car 
and removed a small knife from the person of Mr. McElwain (see R., p.110), those facts 
did not suggest Mr. Bonner presented a risk of danger to the officer.  Cf. State v. 
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 662 (2007) (indicating a defendant’s admission he has a knife 
does not alone justify a Terry frisk because weapon possession, in and of itself, does 
not necessarily mean that a person poses a risk of danger).   
Thus, under the totality of the circumstances, the facts known to 
Officer Mortensen would not have caused a reasonable person to conclude Mr. Bonner 
was armed and dangerous.  See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819.  The officer’s Terry frisk of 
Mr. Bonner was not justified.  See id. at 819-20.   
In sum, Officer Mortensen’s Terry frisk of Mr. Bonner was not justified.  Thus, the 
district court erred when it denied Mr. Bonner’s motion to suppress, because his 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was denied.   
 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Bonner respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court’s order of judgment and reverse the order which denied his motion to 
suppress. 
 DATED this 25th day of March, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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